

LAW REVIEW¹ 26061

September 2026

**Once More, ROA Files an Amicus Curiae Brief in the Supreme Court
Supporting the USERRA Rights of Service Members.
By Captain Samuel F. Wright, JAGC, USN (Ret.)²**

1.3.2.2—Continuous accumulation of seniority—escalator principle.

1.4—USERRA enforcement.

1.5—USERRA and arbitration.

1.8—Relationship between USERRA and other laws/policies.

***George v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc.*, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 12950 (3rd Cir. May 5, 2026).**

¹ I invite the reader's attention to [Law Center | ROA](#). You will find more than 2,300 "Law Review" articles about the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), the title 38 chapters that provide for veterans' benefits administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and other laws that are especially pertinent to those who serve our country in uniform. You will also find a detailed Subject Index, to facilitate finding articles about specific topics. The Reserve Officers Association, now doing business as the Reserve Organization of America (ROA), initiated this column in 1997. I am the author of more than 90% of the articles, but we are always looking for "other than Sam" articles by other lawyers.

² BA 1973 Northwestern University, JD (law degree) 1976 University of Houston, LLM (advanced law degree) 1980 Georgetown University. I served in the Navy and Navy Reserve as a Judge Advocate General's Corps officer and retired in 2007. I am a life member of ROA. I have dealt with USERRA and the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act (VRRRA—the 1940 version of the federal reemployment statute) for 44 years. I developed the interest and expertise in this law during the decade (1982-92) that I worked for the United States Department of Labor (DOL) as an attorney. Together with one other DOL attorney (Susan M. Webman), I largely drafted the proposed VRRRA rewrite that President George H.W. Bush presented to Congress, as his proposal, in February 1991. On 10/13/1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law USERRA, Public Law 103-353, 108 Stat. 3162. The version of USERRA that President Clinton signed in 1994 was 85% the same as the Webman-Wright draft. USERRA is codified in title 38 of the United States Code at sections 4301 through 4335 (38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-35). I have also dealt with the VRRRA and USERRA as a judge advocate in the Navy and Navy Reserve, as an attorney for the Department of Defense (DOD) organization called Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), as an attorney for the United States Office of Special Counsel (OSC), as an attorney in private practice, and as the Director of the Service Members Law Center (SMLC), as a full-time employee of ROA, for six years (2009-15). Please see Law Review 15052 (June 2015), concerning the accomplishments of the SMLC. My paid employment with ROA ended 5/31/2015, but I have continued the work of the SMLC as a volunteer. As of 5/1/2026, I have come out of retirement and have affiliated with Maher Legal Services in an "of counsel" role. You can reach me by e-mail at samuel@maherlegalservices.com or by telephone at (708) 468-8155.

Daniel George is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force Reserve and a life member of the Reserve Organization of America (ROA).³ On the civilian side, he is a pilot for Piedmont Airlines, Inc. (PAI). On its website, PAI describes itself as follows:

As a wholly-owned subsidiary of the American Airlines Group, Piedmont operates nearly 400 daily departures to 55+ cities throughout the eastern United States, from Charlotte, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Headquartered in Salisbury, Maryland, Piedmont Airlines employs more than 11,000 aviation professionals.⁴

ROA and its partners go for a “three-peat” in the United States Supreme Court—three victories in 5 or 6 years.

ROA plans to file an amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) brief in the United States Supreme Court, urging the Court to grant certiorari—to agree to review the erroneous (we believe) decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.⁵ When we file that brief, we will add it to this article as an update. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari and then rules favorably for Colonel George, this will be our third Supreme Court victory in five years. Here are the first two victories:

³ ROA advocates for the rights and interests of service members, without regard to their membership status, or lack thereof, in our organization, but we want them to join so that we can continue and expand our efforts into the next generation and beyond.

⁴ <https://piedmont-airlines.com/about/our-company/>.

⁵ The Third Circuit is the intermediate federal appellate court that sits in Philadelphia and hears appeals from federal district courts in Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the United States Virgin Islands.

Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 597 U.S. 580 (2022).⁶

In a very important decision that was released in June 2022, the Supreme Court held that state courts in Texas and the other states are required to hear and adjudicate claims that state agencies, as employers, have violated USERRA, without regard to state laws or state claims of sovereign immunity. This is important because perhaps 10% of National Guard and Reserve part-timers have civilian jobs working for state agencies. Without this important precedent, those Reserve and Guard personnel would often have no way to enforce their USERRA rights against state agency employers.

With great pro bono (no cost to ROA) help from the prestigious DC law firm Wiley Rein LLP, ROA drafted and filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court, urging the court to grant certiorari in the *Torres* case. After the Court granted certiorari, ROA filed a new amicus brief on the merits. The Court granted certiorari in December 2021 and held the oral argument in March 2022. The decision was released in late June 2022, at the end of the Court's 2021-22 term.

Feliciano v. Department of Transportation, 605 U.S. 38 (2025).

Federal civilian employees who are National Guard or Reserve service members and who are called to active duty, voluntarily or involuntarily, and who suffer a net loss of pay because their active-duty military pay is less than their regular federal civilian pay, are entitled to differential

⁶ This is a decision of the United States Supreme Court. The citation means that you can find this decision in Volume 597 of *United States Reports*, starting on page 580. See *generally* Law Review 24054 (November 2024) for a detailed discussion of the importance and the implications of this decision.

pay to make up the difference, if they meet certain conditions.⁷ In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted section 5538 of title 5 of the United States Code to mean that the federal employee in these circumstances is entitled to differential pay for a period of voluntary or involuntary active duty under any provision of federal law *during a period of war or a national emergency declared by the President or Congress*.⁸

As in the *Torres* case, ROA filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and a new amicus brief on the merits after the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Q: You have written that Feliciano “applied for certiorari” and that the Supreme Court “granted certiorari.” What does that mean?

A: In a civil case, the final appellate step is to apply to the Supreme Court for certiorari (discretionary review). At least four of the Supreme Court’s nine Justices must vote for certiorari, or certiorari is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals or the State high court becomes final. The Supreme Court denies certiorari in about 99% of the cases where a party seeks it.

Q: What role did the Reserve Organization of America (ROA) play in the *Feliciano* case?

⁷ 5 U.S.C. § 5538.

⁸ Except for a brief period during the 1970s, our country has been under one or more national emergency declarations going back as far as 1940.

A: It is much more likely that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari if an organization like ROA files an amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) brief pointing out the importance of the case and urging the Court to grant certiorari. ROA filed an amicus brief urging the Court to grant certiorari. After the Court agreed to hear the case, ROA filed a new brief on the merits.

Q: What is an amicus curiae brief?

A: The term “amicus curiae brief” has been defined as follows:

The term is used to refer to a legal brief, called an amicus brief, that may be filed with an appellate court, including a supreme court, by a party not involved with a current case, but in support of one side or another on the legal issue at hand.⁹

Q: What does ROA seek to accomplish by filing amicus briefs?

A: We draft and file amicus briefs in cases involving the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) and other laws that are especially pertinent to those who serve our country in uniform. We urge the courts, including the United States Supreme Court, to interpret those laws liberally for the benefit of those who are serving or have served in our nation’s armed forces. In its first case construing the 1940 reemployment statute, the Supreme Court held:

This legislation is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great

⁹ See legaldictionary.net/amicus-brief/.

need. *See Boone v. Lightner*, 319 U.S. 561, 575. And no practice of employers or agreements between employers and unions can cut down the service adjustment benefits which Congress has secured the veteran under the Act. Our problem is to construe the separate parts of the Act as parts of an organic whole and give each as liberal a construction for the benefit of the veteran as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits.¹⁰

Q: How did we get here?

A: September 16, 2026 will mark the 86th anniversary of the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act (VRRA).¹¹ Congress enacted the VRRA in 1940, as part of the Selective Training and Service Act (STSA),¹² the law that led to the drafting of more than ten million young men (including my late father) for World War II.

Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah conceived of the idea of requiring civilian employers to reemploy those who were drafted. Senator Thomas offered an amendment to that effect during the STSA debate and convinced his colleagues to adopt it. He explained the rationale for his amendment as follows:

[I]t is not unreasonable to require the employers of such men [those who were drafted and necessarily left their civilian jobs] to rehire them upon completion of their service, since the lives and property of employers, as well as the lives and property of

¹⁰ *Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.*, 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).

¹¹ The VRRA had many formal names, but it was known colloquially as the VRRA until Congress enacted USERRA in 1994.

¹² Public Law 76-783, 54 Stat. 885.

everyone else in the United States, are defended by such service.¹³

As originally enacted in 1940, the VRRRA only applied to those who were drafted, but just one year later Congress amended the VRRRA as part of the Service Extension Act of 1941.¹⁴ The 1941 amendment expanded the law to make it apply to those who voluntarily enlisted, as well as those who were drafted. Almost from the very beginning, the reemployment statute has applied to voluntary as well as involuntary service, but to this day some employers incorrectly relate the right to reemployment to the draft and assume that those who have volunteered do not have the right to reemployment.¹⁵

Since 1940, the VRRRA has applied to the Federal Government and to private employers. In 1974, as part of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act (VEVRRA),¹⁶ Congress amended the VRRRA to make it apply to state and local governments as well. Today's reemployment statute applies to almost all employers in our country, including the Federal Government, state and local governments, and private employers, regardless of size.¹⁷

Facts of the case.¹⁸

¹³ 96 Cong. Rec. 10573 (remarks of Sen. Thomas). This statement was quoted in *Leib v. Georgia Pacific Corp.*, 925 F.2d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 1991).

¹⁴ Public Law 77-213, 55 Stat. 626.

¹⁵ For more than two generations, all military service in our country has been voluntary. In 1973, Congress abolished the draft and established the All-Volunteer Military.

¹⁶ Public Law 93-508, 89 Stat. 1593.

¹⁷ You only need one employee to be an employer for purposes of the reemployment statute. See *Cole v. Swint*, 961 F.2d 58, 60 (5th Cir. 1992).

¹⁸ This recitation of the facts is taken directly from the District Court decision, and the District Judge took these facts directly from the complaint that George filed.

George began working as a First Officer/Pilot for PAI on March 5, 2018, flying various routes lasting between two to five days at a time, beginning and ending in Charlotte, NC. In addition to his employment with Piedmont, George was also a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Air Force Reserve.

In the Fall of 2019, George received notice of long-term military orders to begin on October 1, 2019, and he promptly notified Piedmont of his upcoming deployment. He remained on Piedmont's Pilots Seniority List while on military duty.

Some two years later, Piedmont offered a Pilot Retention Bonus Program which became available in September of 2021 and was intended to incentivize its Pilots to pursue positions at American Airlines, of which it was a wholly-owned subsidiary. The program was memorialized in a "Letter of Agreement between Piedmont Airlines, Inc. and the Airline Pilots in Service of Piedmont Airlines, Inc., as represented by The Airline Pilots Association International," (LOA), which was signed on October 1, 2021, and made a part of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between PAI and the union. Under the LOA, "[o]nly pilots who are on the Piedmont Airlines Pilots' Seniority List as of the Effective Date (September 1, 2021) and pilots hired by Piedmont and added to the Piedmont Airlines Pilots' Seniority List on or before December 31, 2022, shall be eligible to participate in the Program." Because George was on the Seniority List, he was eligible to participate.

The program offered incentive payments/bonuses in the amount of \$70,000 to those "Pre-Flow" Piedmont pilots who within one year of

the program's effective date (September 1, 2021) were hired by American while employed by Piedmont. In November 2021, while still on military service, Plaintiff interviewed and was offered a pilot position with American Airlines, and was given a class date of December 29, 2021 to officially commence employment.

After George was released from active duty, he reported to work for American Airlines, and he applied for the \$70,000 bonus. PAI at first indicated that George would be paid the bonus, but ultimately the company refused to pay. This lawsuit resulted.

George v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc.

Daniel George, through his counsel Brian Lawler, sued PAI in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the case was assigned to Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg. Judge Goldberg dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). Judge Goldberg ruled as follows:

Defendant Piedmont Airlines, Inc. moves for dismissal of the claim raised against it by its former employee Daniel George pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. § 4301, *et. seq.* Because this matter is barred by operation of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, *et. seq.*, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. As such, the motion to dismiss will be granted, and the complaint dismissed.¹⁹

¹⁹ *George v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc.*, 761 F. Supp. 3d 804, 806 (E.D. Pa. 2025).

George appealed the dismissal of his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and a three-judge panel of that court summarily affirmed the dismissal.²⁰

The Relationship Between the Railway Labor Act and the Federal Reemployment Statute.

Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act (RLA) in 1926.²¹ Congress enacted the RLA 14 years before it enacted the VRRRA in 1940 and 69 years before it enacted USERRA in 1994. If there is an irreconcilable contradiction between the RLA and the reemployment statute, the reemployment statute must prevail, as the more recently enacted statute, but the law does not favor repeal by implication. The Supreme Court has held:

The rarity with which [the Court has] discovered implied repeals is due to the relatively stringent standard for such findings, namely, that there be an irreconcilable conflict between the two federal statutes at issue.²²

Accordingly, it is necessary to *harmonize* the reemployment statute with the RLA, and vice versa. In an important 1958 case, the Supreme Court harmonized the apparent inconsistency between the RLA (enacted in 1926) and the reemployment statute (enacted in 1940).

²⁰ *George v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc.*, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 12950 (3rd Cir. May 5, 2020).

²¹ Act of May 20, 1926, 44 Stat. 577. The RLA is codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. As enacted in 1926, the RLA applied only to railroads. In 1936, Congress expanded the law to include airlines as well.

²² *J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc.*, 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).

Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals mentioned that case.

In its opinion, the District Court cited five cases supporting the proposition that the RLA forbids federal and state court lawsuits about disputes that are covered by the RLA and its arbitration scheme.²³ *Not one of those cases addressed the friction between the RLA and the federal reemployment statute.*

In its first case concerning the 1940 reemployment statute, the Supreme Court held: “No practice of employers *or agreements between employers and unions* can cut down the service adjustment benefits that Congress has secured the veteran under the Act.”²⁴ In its fifth case applying the reemployment statute, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the contention that a veteran claiming rights under the reemployment statute was required to exhaust arbitral remedies under the RLA before initiating a lawsuit in federal court against the railroad employer. The Court held:

The rights petitioner asserts are rights created by federal statute *even though their determination may necessarily involve interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.* Although the statute does not itself create a seniority system, but accepts that set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, it requires the application of the principles of that system in a manner that will

²³ *Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris*, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994); *Andrews v. Louisville & N. R. Co.*, 406 U.S. 320, 325 (1972); *International Association of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc.*, 372 U.S. 682, 685 (1963); *Stouffer v. Union R.R. Co. LLC*, 85 F.4th 139, 143 (3rd Cir. 2023); and *Air Line Pilots Association International v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.*, 627 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

²⁴ *Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.*, 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (emphasis supplied).

not deprive the veteran of the benefits, in terms of restoration to position and advancement in status, for which Congress has provided.

Petitioner sues not simply as an employee under a collective bargaining agreement, but as a veteran asserting special rights bestowed upon him in furtherance of a federal policy to protect those who have served in the armed forces. For the effective protection of these distinctively federal rights, Congress provided in § 9(d) of the act that if any employer fails to comply with the provisions of the statute, the District Court, upon the filing of a petition by a person entitled to the benefits of the act, has jurisdiction to compel compliance and to compensate for loss of wages.

The court is enjoined to order speedy hearing in any such case and to advance it on the calendar, and the U.S. attorney must appear and act for the veteran in the prosecution of his claim if reasonably satisfied that he is entitled to the benefits of the act. Nowhere is it suggested that before a veteran can obtain the benefit of this expeditious procedure and the remedies available to him in the District Court, he must exhaust other avenues of relief possibly open under a collective bargaining agreement or before a tribunal such as the National Railway Adjustment Board.

On the contrary, the statutory scheme contemplates the speedy vindication of the veteran's rights by a suit brought immediately in the District Court, advanced on the calendar before other litigation, and prosecuted with the assistance of the U.S. attorney.

Only thus, it evidently was thought, would adequate protection be assured the veteran, since delay in the vindication of re-employment rights might often result in hardship to the veteran and the defeat, for all practical purposes, of the rights Congress sought to give him.

To insist that the veteran first exhaust other possibly lengthy and doubtful procedures on the ground that his claim is not different from any claim that an employee might file under a bargaining agreement would ignore the actual character of the rights asserted and defeat the liberal procedural policy clearly manifested in the statute for the vindication of those rights.²⁵

USERRA's legislative history addresses the relationship between USERRA, collective bargaining agreements, and the RLA as follows:

Section 4302(b) [of USERRA] would reaffirm a general preemption as to State and local laws and ordinances, as well as employer practices and agreements, which provide fewer rights or otherwise limit rights provided under amended chapter 43 [USERRA] or put additional conditions on those rights. *See Peel v. Florida Department of Transportation*, 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979); *Cronin v. Police Department of the City of New York*, 675 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) and *Fishgold, supra*, 328 U.S. at 285, which provide that no employer practice or agreement can reduce, limit, or eliminate any right under chapter 43.

²⁵ *McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.*, 357 U.S. 265, 269-270 (1958) (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, this section would reaffirm that additional resort to mechanisms such as grievance procedures or arbitration or similar administrative appeals is not required. See McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 357 U.S. 265, 270 (1958); Beckley v. Lipe Rollway Corp., 448 F Supp. 563, 567 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).

It is the Committee's [House Committee on Veterans Affairs] intent that, even if a person protected under the Act resorts to arbitration, any arbitration decision shall not be binding as a matter of law. *See Kidder v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060, 1064-65 (S.D. Fla. 1978).*²⁶

In four cases decided after Congress enacted USERRA in 1994, courts have rejected the argument that a person claiming USERRA rights is required to exhaust administrative remedies as a condition precedent to initiating a USERRA lawsuit.²⁷ *All of these cases and legislative history were ignored (not even mentioned) by the District Court and the Court of Appeals.*

Q: *Fishgold* and *McKinney* were decided decades before Congress enacted USERRA in 1994. Why are those cases even relevant?

A: On October 13, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act

²⁶ House Committee Report, April 28, 1993, H.R. Rep. 103-65 (Part 1). This report is reprinted in full in Appendix D-1 of *The USERRA Manual*, by Kathryn Piscitelli and Edward Still. The quoted paragraphs can be found on pages 713-14 of the 2025 edition of the *Manual*.

²⁷ See *Huhmann v. Federal Express Corp.*, 874 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2017); *Hance v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.*, 571 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2009); *Veronko v. County of Suffolk*, 2018 WL 11697437 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); and *Duffer v. United Continental Holdings, Inc.*, 173 F. Supp. 3d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Two of those cases, *Huhmann* and *Hance*, involve employers that are subject to the RLA.

(USERRA)²⁸ as a long-overdue rewrite of the VRRRA. The 1994 law made some significant improvements, but do not think of this law as 32 years old, think of it as 86 years old. USERRA’s legislative history includes the following important statement:

The provisions of Federal law providing members of the uniformed services with employment and reemployment rights, protection against employment-related discrimination, and the protection of certain other rights and benefits have been eminently successful for over fifty years. Therefore, the Committee [House Committee on Veterans Affairs] wishes to stress that the extensive body of case law that has evolved over that period, to the extent that it is consistent with the provisions of this Act, remains in full force and effect in interpreting these provisions. This is particularly true of the basic principle established by the Supreme Court that the Act is to be “liberally construed.” See *Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.*, 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946); *Alabama Power Co. v. Davis*, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977).²⁹

It should also be noted that, as I have stated above, USERRA’s legislative history specifically mentions both *Fishgold* and *McKinney* with approval. The legislative history shows that Congress intended that the new law (USERRA) be interpreted consistently with the existing law (the VRRRA) in most respects, including these specific respects.

²⁸ Public Law 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149. USERRA is codified in title 38 of the United States Code, at sections 4301 through 4335 (38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-35).

²⁹ House Committee Report, April 28, 1993; HR Rep. 103-65 (Part 1). The entire text of this report is reprinted in Appendix D-1 of *The USERRA Manual*, by Kathryn Piscitelli and Edward Still. The quoted paragraph can be found on page 712 of the 2025 edition of the *Manual*.

Q: In Law Review 22048 (August 2022), you (Captain Wright) wrote that the 5th Circuit, the 6th Circuit, and the 9th Circuit have held that section 4302(b) of USERRA does not override or supersede an agreement that an individual signed, usually as a condition of being hired, that agreed that future employment disputes, including USERRA disputes, must be submitted to binding arbitration rather than lawsuits in court. In that article, you urged Congress to enact legislation to overrule those appellate court cases. What gives?

A: I adhere to what I wrote in Law Review 22048, *but that article deals with an entirely separate issue and is not relevant to this discussion.*

In Law Review 22048, I addressed arbitration that an individual employee agreed to in a contract that he or she signed when hired or at some later date. In this article, I am referring to arbitration and other administrative remedies that are provided by a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the union representing the employees.³⁰

When a collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitration of disputes arising under the agreement, the arbitrator's authority is limited to interpreting the collective bargaining agreement and does not include adjudicating disputes under other federal or state laws or legal concepts.³¹ In this case, the arbitrator's interpretation of USERRA is clearly wrong and is not entitled to any weight whatsoever.

³⁰ See *Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.*, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

³¹ See *United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.*, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

Q: Where can I find a lawyer or law firm that fully understands laws like the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and other laws that are especially pertinent to those who serve our country in uniform?

A: As of 5/1/2026, I have come out of retirement and have joined Maher Legal Services in an “of counsel” role. This firm has a great team, headed by attorneys John Maher and Kevin Mikolashek, both of whom have served as Army judge advocates for many years. These attorneys and this firm have a great record, and I am proud to join their team.

Here is a link to the Maher Legal Services website:

<https://www.lawyersdefendingwarriors.com/about>.

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ROA is the only national military organization dedicated exclusively to America's reserve components — all eight of them. From the 6,179 members of the Coast Guard Reserve to the 329,705 soldiers of the Army National Guard, ROA exists to serve the nearly 773,000 men and

women who answer the call while maintaining civilian lives. No other organization does what we do for the people we serve.

Our roots run deep. On October 2, 1922, veterans of the Great War gathered at Washington's historic Willard Hotel — at the invitation of General of the Armies John J. Pershing — to build something lasting. One of the junior officers in that room was Captain Harry S. Truman, who, as President, signed ROA's congressional charter in 1950. That charter gives us a clear mission: advocate for policies that ensure adequate national security. For more than a century, we've made the case that America's Reserve Components and National Guard are among the most cost-effective pillars of our national defense.

Beyond this library of legal resources, ROA files *amicus curiae* ("friend of the court") briefs in the Supreme Court and other courts and actively educates service members, military spouses, attorneys, employers, legislators, and others about the legal rights of those who serve — and how to enforce them. We provide this information to all service members, regardless of membership. But it's ROA members — through their dues and contributions — who make it possible.

Your membership makes the mission possible.

If you are currently serving, or have ever served, in any of America's eight uniformed services, you are eligible to join ROA — and membership starts at just \$20 for a full year, or \$450 for life. Officers and enlisted personnel alike qualify, whether your service was in the Active Component, the National Guard, or the Reserve. Spouses, widows, widowers, ancestors (parents or grandparents), and lineal

descendants of past or present service members are also eligible to join, so families can stand with those who serve. Join online at [Reserve Organization of America - ROA](#) or call 800-809-9448.

If you are not eligible for membership but believe in this mission, your financial contribution directly funds this resource and the advocacy work that protects those who serve. Donations may be mailed to:

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